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When Punishment Pays
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Abstract
Explaining cooperation in groups remains a key problem because reciprocity breaks down between more than two.
Punishing individuals who contribute little provides a potential answer but changes the dilemma to why pay the costs of
punishing which, like cooperation itself, provides a public good. Nevertheless, people are observed to punish others in
behavioural economic games, posing a problem for existing theory which highlights the difficulty in explaining the spread
and persistence of punishment. Here, I consider the apparent mismatch between theory and evidence and show by means
of instructive analysis and simulation how much of the experimental evidence for punishment comes from scenarios in
which punishers may expect to obtain a net benefit from punishing free-riders. In repeated games within groups,
punishment works by imposing costs on defectors so that it pays them to switch to cooperating. Both punishers and non-
punishers then benefit from the resulting increase in cooperation, hence investing in punishment can constitute a social
dilemma. However, I show the conditions in which the benefits of increased cooperation are so great that they more than
offset the costs of punishing, thereby removing the temptation to free-ride on others’ investments and making punishment
explicable in terms of direct self-interest. Crucially, this is because of the leveraging effect imposed in typical studies
whereby people can pay a small cost to inflict a heavy loss on a punished individual. In contrast to previous models
suggesting punishment is disadvantaged when rare, I show it can invade until it comes into a producer-scrounger
equilibrium with non-punishers. I conclude that adding punishment to an iterated public goods game can solve the
problem of achieving cooperation by removing the social dilemma.
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Introduction
The social dilemma of a public goods game arises because one
makes a profit on others’ investments but a loss on one’s own.
Reciprocity has been shown to be an effective solution to the
problem of cooperation in pairs [1] but breaks down in larger
groups because it is not possible to retaliate against individual
defectors without damaging group cooperation further [2]. How
cooperation may be established in public goods dilemmas in
groups of more than two remains a key problem. In principle
punishment provides a way of overcoming this problem by
allowing retaliation against individuals [3]. However, punishment
is itself costly to perform. As such, it is widely stated that
punishment poses a public goods dilemma, just as does cooper-
ation itself and hence that both its emergence and its stability raise
major questions. ‘Second order’ free-riders who fail to punish,
even if they contribute to the joint enterprise, should theoretically
invade punishers, leading to unstable punishment and in turn
reduced cooperation [4–12]. Hence, far from solving the problem
of explaining cooperation in groups, punishment seems simply to
replace it with a new conundrum [13].
Nevertheless, punishment is widespread in human societies and
also occurs in other species [14]. Examples include punishing
subordinates for failing to help in superb fairy wrens [15]; chasing
cleaner-fish that feed on host tissue rather than ectoparasites [16];
and punishing subordinates for pregnancy in meerkats [17]. A
particular focus has been on studying punishment in humans in
the context of experimental economic games [18–24]. Typically,
the design of such experiments is to invite participants to play
public goods games which are followed by an opportunity to
punish others in the light of their contributions. Punishment
typically costs the punisher and inflicts a greater cost on the
punished. Studies have used either a ‘‘stranger’’ design in which
group membership changes on each round [18] or a ‘‘partner’’
design in which individuals interact repeatedly within the same
group [19–22,25]. In both designs, the fact that people will punish
others at a cost to themselves has been considered ‘‘altruistic’’ [18]
leading to the suggestion that it might be explained by group-
selected other-regarding preferences [26]. However, punishment
in the Fehr & Gachter experiment reduced both individual and
group payoffs, so groups with punishment would actually do worse
than those without. In contrast, more recent work using a partner
design with larger numbers of rounds has demonstrated that
punishment can increase group payoffs. Nevertheless, this has
been interpreted as evidence for group selection in the sense of
individuals paying a cost to benefit the group [20].
A number of theoretical models have attempted to explain
punishment. One suggestion is that when defectors are rare, the
costs of punishment become low so it may be maintained in the
population [6,27]. However, these models cannot account for the
initial establishment of cooperation and punishment. Nor can the
group level benefits upon which such models are based explain
why individuals punish even when this reduces group payoffs as in
[18]. A recent model suggests punishment can spread when it is
coordinated [12], yet this argument appears to suffer from the
logical flaw that if everyone can agree to punish, then everyone
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could agree to cooperate in the first place, making punishment
redundant. Another idea is that the ability to opt-out of
participation in public goods production and use can facilitate
the spread of punishment [10,28], but this depends on restrictive
assumptions [29]. Alternatively, allowing individuals to develop a
reputation for punishing may enhance the spread of punishment
and thereby cooperation [22,30,31]. Recent models conclude that
while punishment might in principle be selfish, selection is unlikely
to support punishment under any ‘‘interesting’’ conditions [32,33].
In consequence, a review concluded that explaining the observed
tendency of people to punish ‘‘remains an open issue’’ [4].
There are two issues here: most crucially, why do people punish
at all when it is costly, and secondly why does this continue when
people are told they are anonymous and will only meet once. The
latter issue has been addressed in general terms by a number of
authors [34–37]. A full discussion is beyond the scope of this
article, but here I take the view that natural selection has fashioned
psychological mechanisms which lead us to behave in ways which
are on average adaptive. Therefore any particular instance of a
behaviour such as cooperation or punishment needs to be
understood in the context of us having, for example, reward
centres that are activated by cooperating or punishing [38,39].
The key question is the functional one of why punishing is in
general adaptive so that we are designed with reward systems that
make punishment an essentially emotional response [39]. If we can
explain that, then we can postulate why we have the psychological
mechanisms that motivate us to punish even when in the
somewhat abstract confines of a one-shot economic experimental
game this may not always be in our best monetary interests (e.g.
[40] p. 126; [41]). This logic holds for punishment just as much as
for cooperation. It is typically found that people cooperate more
than predicted in one-shot encounters [42]. Yet this can be
understood in terms of the benefits of cooperating in repeated
encounters [1] making it worth having a disposition towards being
‘nice’, i.e. commencing an interaction with cooperation [43].
Similarly, I consider the key question to be why should people be
designed with a propensity to punish? To answer this we first need
to understand under what conditions punishment might on
average be in one’s own self interest. Just as with cooperation,
the question becomes, when can it be worth paying a short term
cost in order to on average receive more substantial long term
benefits? Such an approach acknowledges that cultural processes
as well as genetic evolution may have played an important role in
determining human punishment norms [23,44]. My focus on
repeated games reflects the fact that these are the most relevant for
understanding how cooperation has evolved in human groups, and
is consistent with the focus of much recent work on punishment
[20,21,45,46]. Some authors have of course already pointed out
that for punishment to evolve it must have some direct or indirect
benefits [3,6,47,48]. Here I elucidate the way in which such direct
benefits may arise from punishment and thereby resolve the
second order dilemma in repeated games. In doing so I focus on
the extent to which such benefits might explain recent evidence for
punishment in behavioural economic games.
Analysis of when punishment pays in repeated
games
Here I develop an analytical treatment of when punishment
pays in repeated games. It is almost universally assumed that costly
behaviours pose a social dilemma e.g. [4,12,18,20]. Of course,
such a dilemma may be resolved through reciprocity, but it is
rarely considered that behaviours which benefit others may also
bring direct fitness benefits to the actor which offset their short
term cost without any need for reciprocity [49]. I show here that
within a wide parameter space typical of experimental economic
games, punishment is self-interested and that it therefore does not
pose a second order dilemma. The superimposition of this self-
interested punishment game on top of a public goods dilemma can
solve the problem of cooperation in groups and explain why
people are observed to punish others.
To see how punishment can be self-interested, consider how
punishing works through increasing the payoff for cooperation
relative to defection. Here I consider repeated games between the
same sets of players in which players first decide whether to
cooperate or defect and secondly make a decision about whether
to punish defectors. I consider decisions about whether or not to
cooperate and whether or not to punish as being distinct. This
avoids the linkage between the traits typically assumed in previous
treatments in which cooperators punish [3,33] and allows these
two domains of prosociality to evolve independently. Assuming
that individuals choose between cooperating and defecting
according to which generates the higher payoff, then a defector
should respond to being punished by switching to cooperating
when the payoffs for defecting decline below the payoffs for
cooperating, i.e. when:
xPccz 1{xð ÞPcdwxPdcz 1{xð ÞPdd{qr
where Pcd is the payoff to a cooperator interacting with defector,
co-operators are in proportion x, q is the cost incurred on being
punished and r is the average rate of punishment experienced by a
defector. If cooperation has net cost c to the cooperator and
benefit b to all other group members, this becomes:
x b{cð Þ{ 1{xð Þcwx b{qrð Þ{ 1{xð Þqr
which simplifies to
qrwc ð1Þ
This means that defectors should switch to cooperating when the
costs they incur by being punished exceed the net costs of
cooperating (cf. [6]). I refer to such defectors as ‘responsive
defectors’.
Note that the analysis here is based on the rationale that
punishment is a means by which defectors can be encouraged to
cooperate. If co-operators are punished then cooperation is always
uneconomic, since they bear both the costs of cooperating and the
costs of being punished whereas defectors bear neither. The
phenomenon of antisocial punishment [24] cannot therefore be
explained as a means of encouraging cooperation.
Secondly consider how the payoffs to co-operators vary with the
frequency of co-operators. As above, the payoff P to co-operators
at frequency x is
xPccz 1{xð ÞPcd~x b{cð Þ{ 1{xð Þc~xb{c:
Thus, the payoff to cooperators increases with their frequency. So
by punishing responsive defectors and thereby encouraging them
to switch to cooperation, punishers could in principle benefit
themselves. The problem is that non-punishers also benefit from
any increase in cooperators. It therefore appears that punishers
should do less well than others who do not punish. So why pay the
cost of punishing?
Following (Roberts 2005) consider the scenario in Table 1a in
which a punisher and a non-punisher are in a group with a
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responsive defector. Here p is the cost of carrying out one unit of
punishment and s is an individual’s benefits arising from the
expected increase in cooperation when any group member
punishes. Provided s.p then there is no temptation to avoid
paying the costs of punishing: punishment is always the best option
so will be favoured by individual self-interest. In other words,
provided the gains from increased cooperativeness exceed the costs
of punishing, punishing can be self-interested. In this case
punishment is an example of ‘‘weak altruism’’ ([50] see [49] and
[36] for analysis of such instances).
How can we calculate the benefits of punishing denoted by s
above? Following on from the derivation in Equation 1 above that
responsive defectors should switch to cooperating when the costs of
being punished exceed those invested, in effect every unit lost to
being punished means an additional unit should be invested in
cooperating. The additional benefits arising to a punisher as a
result of an act of punishment will therefore be the extra number
of acts of cooperation performed over the remaining rounds
(which is simply the cost incurred on being punished q divided by
the net cost of cooperating c) multiplied by the extra benefits b to
the individual of each cooperation. Thus the benefits of punishing
are:
s~qb=c
and the condition for punishment to pay is where these benefits
exceeds the costs of punishment p, i.e where:
pvqb=c ð2Þ
In other words, the act of punishing (carried out by a punisher who
may be either a cooperator or a defector) will invade when its
effect on switching a defector to cooperating brings a net return to
the punisher through increased cooperation. For simplicity, this
assumes both that there are sufficient remaining rounds for the
additional cooperative acts to take place and that cooperation is
not already at a maximal level.
Note that an investment i results in benefit ki/g where k is the
multiple applied to cooperative investments when pooled and g is
group size. The net cost c= i-ki/g. In typical experiments
[18,20,23] parameters are k=2, g=3, p=1, q=3 (or similar)
and so for i=1 we have c=0.33 and b=0.67. Solving the
punishment condition we can see that for every unit invested in
punishment, the punisher obtains 6 units in return. A social
dilemma only exists where the return on investment is less than 1
(e.g. if contributions to a group pool are doubled and then divided
by three group members then each unit invested only yields 0.67
in return). Therefore with these parameters punishment does not
pose a social dilemma and is in fact in the direct self-interest of the
punisher.
The above punishment ratio of 1:3 is widely used without
justification being offered. Whereas in laboratory economic games
one can set sanctioning regimes arbitrarily, the question arises as
to whether effective punishment of free-riders could be achieved in
more real-world settings with such high relative costs to the
punished. One possibility favouring punishment is that there are
strong asymmetries between dominant punishers and subordinates
that are punished [14]. However, if interactions are symmetric,
punished individuals may equally well retaliate. Such retaliation
may be incorporated most simply by considering p and q to be the
net costs following a cycle of punishment with retaliation, which
we would expect to give a ration of equivalence. It is interesting to
note that with p=1, q=1 and keeping k=2, g=3 then investment
in punishment still reaps double the rewards from increased
cooperation. This counterintuitive result is due to the fact that
costs inflicted by punishment translate into net costs of investing in
cooperation; the actual investment in cooperation is then i= c/
(12k/g) = 3, which yields b= ki/g=2 units to the punisher. Thus,
provided the reasonable assumption that cooperation pays holds
(k.g), punishment remains unlikely to represent a social dilemma.
It is generally held that punishers cannot invade [4], but as
shown in Equation 2, where its short term cost is outweighed by
longer term benefits through increased cooperation of partners, it
can be self-interested. Punishment can invade where there is
sufficient chance of re-meeting the punished and for them to
respond by cooperating such that punishers recoup their costs.
As stated above, the analysis thus far assumes that cooperation is
below maximal so it is possible for punishment to increase it; that
there are sufficient future rounds for a punished individual to
respond; and that each additional act of punishment will have an
additive effect on the level of cooperation. Such assumptions are
reasonable for examining invasion conditions, but as punishment
and cooperation spread, so the chances of the assumptions being
violated will increase. We could approximate the effect of whether
there are sufficient rounds for a punished individual to respond by
incorporating functions dependent on the probability that
interactions continue (w as in [1]). This would encapsulate the
Table 1. Whether or not to punish a defector.
a
Punisher Non-punisher
Punisher 2s - p s - p
Non-punisher s 0
b
Punisher Non-punisher
Punisher s - p s - p
Non-punisher s 0
Payoffs to punishers and non-punishers when with a defector in a group of three. Payoffs are shown for the row player only. p is the cost of carrying out one unit of
punishment and s is the benefit an individual receives when any group member punishes. This benefit is assumed to arise from defectors switching to cooperating after
being punished. Provided s.p punishment pays. In (a) each act of punishment has an additive effect on the benefits arising, whereas in (b) punishing when another
individual is already punishing brings no additional benefit.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057378.t001
When Punishment Pays
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 March 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 3 | e57378
logic that as the chance of repeated interactions declines, so will
the benefits of punishing. We could also approximate the effect of
the proportion of punishers x, such that the condition for
punishment to pay would be a function of the proportion of
non-punishers. It also formalizes the prediction that as punishers
become more common, so the additive effect of punishment in
increasing cooperation will asymptote. However, analytical
solutions become unwieldy, especially as the switch from defecting
to cooperating involves a step change. Rather than attempt to
numerically predict when punishment will pay in relation to
varying numbers of rounds and frequencies of punishers, I leave
the prediction of the evolutionary dynamics to the simulations
below and instead move on from analysing the simplified invasion
conditions above to determining whether we can expect punish-
ment to be stable.
To consider stability of punishment, I examine the case where
increasing punishment would have no effect and one therefore
prefers others to do the punishing. Table 1b considers the case
where punishing has no additional effect given that one other
member of the group is already punishing a responsive defector.
This scenario may arise where one act of punishment is so effective
that the responsive defector cannot respond by increasing its
cooperation any further even if it were to be subjected to more
punishment. Non-punishers then do best when another group
member punishes the responsive defector (s.s-p) but if no other
individual is punishing then it can be best to punish provided s.p.
Such a payoff matrix resembles a chicken, snowdrift [51] or
producer-scrounger game [52]. In such a game we can expect a
mixture of punishing and non-punishing strategies to persist at
equilibrium due to the diminishing returns of punishment as it
increases in frequency (cf. [3] but note that these authors reported
any other outcome was also possible in their models).
We can show that there will be an equilibrium at an
intermediate frequency x of punishers by solving for when the
fitness of punishersWP equals that of non-punishersWN. Assuming
that punishers pay the cost of punishing; that, as discussed in the
previous paragraph, punishment is non-additive in its effects, such
that the presence of other punishers would not increase
cooperation further; that the public goods game is repeated for
sufficient rounds for punishers to get the full benefits of increased
cooperation; and with a baseline fitness of 1; then WP=12p+qb/c.
Non-punishers meeting a punisher get the benefits of increased
cooperation in the group caused by the punisher’s act without
paying the costs of punishing; whereas on their own they just get
the baseline fitness, so: WN= x(1+qb/c)+(1-x). Thus, an intermedi-
ate equilibrium will occur at x=1-p/(qb/c). Taking values from
[20] of p=1, q=3, b=0.5, c=0.5, this would suggest an
approximate equilibrium frequency of punishers in this case of
x=2/3.
We can therefore see that there will be a range of payoff
matrices generated by the punishment and cooperation games and
that attempting to view them within any one framework, be it as a
public goods game or a snowdrift game will be too limited. Rather,
it is better to identify the fitness functions of different strategies in
relation to their cost and benefit functions and strategy frequencies
[53]. Such an approach shows how varying the parameters readily
leads to transitions between recognized game matrices. In order to
test how the insights gained above apply to evolving levels of
cooperation and punishment strategies, I turn to using simulation
techniques.
Simulation of how cooperation and punishment
evolve
The previous section addresses the question of when a co-
operator should punish a responsive defector. Here I consider the
evolution of cooperation and punishment strategies. A simulation
model was developed in which cooperation and punishment
strategies were genetically determined. Unlike in most previous
models, defectors were, as in the analytical section above,
responsive to punishment. Thus those that experienced punish-
ment could reduce their losses by cooperating, meaning that
punishers could manipulate responsive defectors into cooperating
with them during the course of an interaction. Such a responsive
strategy is analogous to the way in which Tit-for-Tat [1] responds
to experience. Agents had a cooperative strategy of either
cooperator C or responsive defector D. If agents cooperated, they
paid a cost i which resulted in a group benefit ki where k was a
multiple applied to cooperative investments in the group. Cost i
was a fixed quantity within simulations but was varied between
simulations; thus cooperating was a binary decision and there was
no continuous variation in generosity between individuals. Each
individual in a group of size g then received ki/g for each
cooperative act, giving a net cost of i-ki/g. All individuals also had
a punishment strategy of punish P or non-punishing N. Punish-
ment involved paying a cost p to impose a cost q on a punished
individual. Again, costs p and q were fixed within simulations and
varied between simulations, thus the decision to punish was a
binary one. Punishment could only be inflicted on defectors – I
therefore did not consider antisocial punishment [24]. All
combinations DN DP CN CP were considered as separate strategies
so that strategies could not do well due to linkage [33]. Simulations
were initialized with DN at 100% so C and P could only arise
through mutation and invasion.
Defectors responded to the punishment regime experienced in
the following way. When the sum of the costs experienced by
defectors was greater as a result of being punished than as a result
of cooperating, they switched behaviour to cooperation, and vice-
versa. Specifically, responsive defectors cooperated when the sum
of the costs they had incurred through being punished exceeded
the net costs they had incurred cooperating (i.e. their investment in
cooperation minus the benefit which they, like all individuals in the
group, received from this) and switched back when the reverse was
true. Thus punishers could manipulate responsive defectors into
cooperating with them within their own lifetimes, while those that
experienced punishment could reduce their losses by cooperating.
However, once responsive defectors had expended more on
cooperating than they had lost being punished they switched back
to defecting.
The model was based on a meta-population or island structure
(in order to avoid effects of genetic drift that can occur when
considering a single population [54]) in which each of 10 islands
contained a population of N=3000 agents. Unless otherwise
stated, agents began with an endowment of 6 points in order to
avoid complications from negative fitnesses. Interactions were
played out within fixed groups of size g randomly chosen from the
population. Within groups, agents were selected in turn and given
an opportunity to cooperate according to their strategy, as
described above. Once all had played within the group, each
was then given the opportunity to punish any agents who had
defected (i.e. for every pairwise combination of agents, each agent
with strategy P punished the other agent, if and only if the latter
had defected, by paying a cost p to inflict cost q). These procedures
were repeated for m meetings (where m=20 unless otherwise
stated) within each of the N/g groups within each island. At the
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end of each generation, offspring were produced for the next
generation in direct proportion to the sums of the payoffs for each
of the four strategy combinations. These relative payoffs were
calculated both within islands, to produce the local reproductive
success and across all islands to find the global reproductive
success. An individual for the next generation was then derived
locally with probability 0.8 and globally with probability 0.2. This
method reduces the potential for genetic drift and allows migration
of successful strategies among islands [54]. Note that while a
responsive defector meeting a punisher may play cooperative
moves during its lifetime, its payoffs nevertheless contribute to the
number of responsive defectors there will be in the next generation
and not to the number that inherit the cooperate strategy. In other
words, it is the response rule rather than the response which is
inherited. Reproduction was accompanied by mutation such that
with probability m=0.01 an individual’s strategy was replaced at
random with any one of the other strategies (so, for example,
adopting punishment did not first require a transition to being
cooperative).
Analysis focussed on groups of 3 as these are the simplest case
where cooperation cannot be explained by reciprocity. I first
checked that cooperation cannot spread in the absence of
punishment. With parameters g=3, k=2 the mean level of
cooperation C was 0.87% (60.002 s.e.; unless otherwise stated, all
summary statistics are means across 10 simulations for generations
1000–2000). Thus cooperation did not spread above a low level.
Using the same parameters but introducing punishment strategies
without any dynamic adjustment of defectors to their level of
punishment experienced (i.e. unresponsive defectors) gave a
similar level of cooperation, C=1.25% (60.01) while punishment
P remained at a very low level: P=0.10 (60.001). Thus
punishment alone did not facilitate cooperation. This is consistent
with previous models where punishment cannot invade [6,27].
I then introduced the facultative adjustment rule described
above whereby Defectors responded to being punished. With
typical economic experiment values g=3, k=2, p=1, q=3, both
punishing and cooperative strategies invade from zero levels and
come into equilibrium (Fig. 1). The mean strategy percentages
across 10 simulations were DN=3.23 (60.009), DP=2.83 (60.02),
CN=45.91 (60.08), CP=48.03 (60.10) (Fig. 1a). This resulted in
an overall mean cooperation level of 93.9460.02 and mean
punishment of 50.86 (60.09) (Fig. 1b). Note that although only the
first 2000 generations are given, levels were stable for much longer
e.g. means across 10 simulations between generations 9000 and
10000 were: C=93.98 (60.03), P=50.93 (60.08).
Above, it was predicted that punishment can pay where p,qb/c.
To test how punishment and cooperation varied with their costs
and benefits, the ratios p:q and b:c were varied (the latter through
varying k:g). As predicted, a high level of cooperation was found
only where the equation above held true (Table 2).
As shown above, cooperation and punishment can only
establish in this system with the response rule. Therefore it is
not surprising that with average number of meetings m=1, there is
little of either (C= 11.8460.04, P = 1.8960.01). However 4
meetings are sufficient for levels of cooperation and punishment
almost identical to those for the standard conditions of m=20
(C= 93.5060.04, P= 32.2560.10) while adding further meetings
has little effect (e.g. with m=30, C= 96.5460.02,
P = 38.2060.12).
While punishment facilitated cooperation, amongst cooperators
there tended to be a high proportion of non-punishers (Fig. 1). In
groups of 3, if one punishes a responsive defector then it is only
beneficial for another also to punish the responsive defector if
there is an additive effect on resulting cooperation. If the
parameters are changed so that there is an additive effect of 2
individuals in a group of 3 both punishing then higher levels of
punishment result (e.g. with g=3, k=2, p=0.2, q=0.3,
P=70.6960.03 and C=63.0360.12). Note that here cooperation
is lower due to the less favourable p:q ratio.
How does group size affect cooperation and punishment?
Substituting into p,qb/c where b= ki/g and c=1-ki/g and
rearranging, we get
kwgp= pzqð Þ:
This formula is of value in deducing how great the synergistic
effects of cooperation must be for punishment to invade in groups
of different sizes. For example, with g=3, p=1, q=3, k must be
.0.75; with g=8 k must be .2; and with g=20, k must be .5.
These analytical results were confirmed by simulation.
Discussion
These results demonstrate that punishment can facilitate the
invasion of cooperation in repeated games which then persists in
stable equilibrium at a high level. Thus, in contrast to previous
models, punishment can both invade and resist invasion. There is
no requirement for a critical frequency of punishers and the
Figure 1. The evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and
punishment. Representative example of strategy dynamics from the
first of 10 simulations with parameters g=3, k=2, p= 1, q= 3, showing
(a) frequencies of all strategy combinations (C = cooperator, D= re-
sponsive defector; P =punisher, N =non-punisher) and (b) summed
frequencies of cooperative and punishing strategies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057378.g001
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dynamics do not result in alternative equilibria [3,27]. Because
punishment is costly it has been almost universally assumed that it
constitutes a social dilemma [4–11,20,55,56]. However, what has
typically been overlooked is that this need not be the case provided
a punisher’s own benefit from punishing exceeds its costs. This
becomes increasingly likely if we allow responsive strategies such
that punished individuals switch to cooperating. It has previously
been suggested that individuals may cooperate more with those
that are more likely to punish them [6]; this paper demonstrates
one mechanism as to how that may be achieved. The mechanism
of switching to cooperation after being punished is not only highly
plausible but has been demonstrated in natural systems [16].
A recent study found evidence for punishment being carried out
for self-serving reasons: if a female cleaner wrasse cheats on a
client, then a male servicing the same client may punish this
female [46]. This encourages the female to be more cooperative,
which in turn benefits the male as he is less likely to lose a client.
Interestingly, punishment in this instance may be facilitated by the
greater strength of males, which fits with the analysis showing that
punishment is more likely to be found where the ratio of costs
favours the punisher.
Applying this to recent experimental results, it can be
understood why people might employ punishment in public goods
games. In typical experiments the relation p,qb/c will hold; e.g. in
[20], g=3, k=1.5 (so b=0.5 and c=0.5), p=1 and q=3 therefore
1,3*0.5/0.5 holds true and punishment can be self-interested in
the context of a invasion in a repeated game. The situation is
somewhat more complex where cooperation is not a binary
decision but a variable between 0–20 and investment in
punishment varies between 0–10 points [18,20]. Nevertheless, in
[20] a small investment in punishment produces a greater increase
in cooperative rewards: individuals spend on average 0.46 on
punishment which raises contributions from 7.2 without punish-
ment to 16.8 with; this in turn raises net income from 23.6 without
punishment to 26.6 with punishment. It is therefore in an
individual’s own direct self interest to punish, at least at the
average level. As shown here, it will typically take several rounds of
cooperation by a punished individual (depending on the response
rule) before punishing becomes profitable. Thus, the results in [20]
whereby punishment becomes profitable with 50 rounds but not
with only 10 rounds can be understood. Note the crucial difference
that the result in [20] is interpreted in terms of group selection of
individually costly behaviour whereas here I have shown it is not
individually costly but individually beneficial.
Further experiments systematically varying the costs and
benefits of punishing and cooperating would be valuable to test
the models presented here. One study that varied punishment
parameters found results consistent with the analysis presented
here [57]. In their experiments, c=0.5 and b=0.5 and four
punishment conditions were employed: p=1, q=3; p=1, q=1;
p=3, q= 3; p=3, q=1. Substituting into p,qb/c we find that
only the p=1, q=3 case satisfies the condition for punishment to
pay. This is consistent with the experimental findings; cooperation
increased only in this condition. The significance of this is that
individuals are sensitive to the costs and benefits they receive and
are not simply punishing out of altruistic or other-regarding
motivations as has been proposed.
An interesting aspect of the simulation results is that in groups of
three or more, punishers and non-punishers come into stable
equilibrium. This is because punishment is only worthwhile if it
provides an additive benefit; if not then it may be better to allow
another individual to do the punishing. In such circumstances, the
scenario becomes a snowdrift game [51] whereby the best
response to cooperation is defection and vice versa, as discussed
at the end of Section 2. A ‘producer-scrounger’ type of equilibrium
is established between punishers and non-punishers. As demon-
strated by [53], where individuals invest in a resource (in this case
punishment) from which all in a group benefit, the payoffs
experienced can shift through mutual benefit to snowdrift to public
goods game as parameters are varied.
The current findings compare with those of [58] who showed
that cooperation could be supported if players know the
reputations of their co-players, i.e. whether they have punished
or not. In the current model, players do not need to know
reputations, they simply respond to the level of punishment to
which they have been subjected.
An empirical study of punishment in repeated games has
reported that non-punishers achieve higher payoffs than punishers
[21]. This was interpreted as showing that costly punishment was
maladaptive, so appears at odds with the predictions made here.
However, the study of [21], as well as theoretical work by [45,59],
uses a scenario which differs fundamentally from the rest of the
literature on punishment. In these studies, punishment is an
alternative to cooperation rather than being a subsequent decision.
Furthermore, they consider only pair-wise interactions in which
cooperation is not problematic because it is well established that
full cooperation can be readily achieved through strategies such as
Tit-for-Tat [1]. The question these authors consider is effectively
whether a population of individuals playing Tit-for-Tat-based full
cooperation can be invaded by individuals which will reduce their
own payoff to reduce their partner’s payoff. By definition this
cannot result in increased payoffs, so the conclusion that ‘‘winners
don’t punish’’ simply recovers the particular assumptions behind
these specific studies and has no general meaning. Indeed, the
issue of punishment does not arise in pairs: it is only in larger
groups that punishment may be of value because it offers a means
to direct retaliation at individuals whereas defection effectively
punishes all group members whether they have cooperated or not
[3].
Table 2. The leveraging effect of cost to benefit ratios on cooperation and punishment.
p/q
1/1 1/2 1/3
1/3 0.0960.008 0.2660.001 0.1960.009 1.4860.007 96.3960.04 44.7160.11
k/g 1.5/3 1.0360.002 19.5560.03 92.5660.04 48.4960.06 95.1760.03 41.9860.09
2/3 80.8160.10 45.9560.04 92.6460.03 48.3660.08 93.9460.02 50.8660.09
Varying k with g= 3 and varying q with p= 1. Cells give mean (6 s.e.m.) cooperation (first figure) and punishment (second figure), each computed for generations 1001–
2000 and averaged across 10 simulations. The area below the stepped line represents the condition p,qb/c (where c= i -ki/g and b= ki/g).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057378.t002
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The dilemma of a public goods game is that an individual’s
stake in the cooperative benefits is less than their investment, but
in the punishment game, each point spent on punishment can
yield more points in terms of increased cooperation. Therefore the
public goods game of cooperation can be solved by superimposing
a self-interest game. The significance of this is that punishment has
been cited as one of the main planks of evidence for a proposed
phenomenon of ‘‘strong reciprocity’’ in which individuals are said
to reward altruists and punish defectors even when this runs
contrary to self interest [60]. Advocates of this view have claimed
that such behaviour challenges the self-interest paradigm [26] that
has been fundamental to economic and evolutionary approaches.
They have gone on to claim that other-regarding preferences are
the consequence of culturally group-selected norms [61].
Models of punishment in the context of strong reciprocity have
claimed to demonstrate how punishment can spread [60,62].
However, this result is subject to the unrealistic constraint that
cooperating and punishing must be tightly linked [33]. The
interpretation is further clouded by the modellers’ confusion over
what is driving selection in these systems: Lehmann et al conclude
that punishment actually spreads because helping functions as a
tag allowing spiteful behaviour towards non-punishers.
If, as I have demonstrated, punishment is typically not a social
dilemma then it cannot provide evidence of group-selected other-
regarding preferences, at least in the repeated games studied here
and by e.g. [20]. Cooperating and punishing in one-shot
interactions will remain a subject of debate, but just as reciprocity
in repeated games [1] helps elucidate cooperation in one-shot
games [41] so understanding when punishing can pay in repeated
games should lead us toward understanding why people continue
to punish in one-shot interactions. Explanations invoking group
selection [27], opt-outs [10], reputation benefits [19,22], coordi-
nation [12] and pool punishment [8] may therefore extend the
range of parameters in which punishment pays, including to larger
group sizes than considered here, but such mechanisms may not
be necessary to explain punishment in small groups of repeatedly
interacting individuals. The argument that punishment can be self-
interested has been applied to recent work on animals [46,63].
Punishment can pay in humans too, and may therefore be an
important force stabilizing group cooperation.
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